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Mutually Implicated Myths: The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
and Militarism 
 
Katharine M. Millar 
(This piece is a chapter in the forthcoming volume Myths and International Politics: A 
Mythographical Approach to the Study of IR, Bliesemann DeGuevara, B., ed. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, anticipated 2016). 
 
[6,959 words, abstract excluded] 
 
Abstract: 
In the post-war era, international organizations have increasingly promoted the democratic 
control of the armed forces (DCAF) in new and transitional states. As DCAF employs the 
language of accountability, rationality, and peace, the principle has an explicitly normative 
character. Utilizing Foucauldian theory, this chapter argues that the purportedly pacific nature 
of DCAF, however, is a potent policy myth which is subtly dependent upon a secondary myth 
– militarism. The chapter examines the implication of academics and policymakers in the 
construction and reification of these mutually-reinforcing myths. Overall, it is argued that the 
discourse of militarism identifies the valorization of violence by democratic societies as 
‘deviant’ exceptions to the generally pacific nature of DCAF, normalizing the quotidian 
reliance of democracies upon the (potential) for political violence. 
 
Introduction 
Clausewitz’s aphorism – ‘War is a continuation of politics by other means’ – may be read as 
a policy prescription identifying the appropriate relationship between state authorities and 
institutions of violence. The construction of war as a form of policy, subject, as any other, to 
the will of the political authorities, thus presents an instrumental understanding of the use of 
force that represents and informs a long intellectual tradition extolling the benefits of the 
political/civilian control of the military. The transition from generally civilian to specifically 
democratic control of the armed forces has been halting, as ‘historically, the two have been 
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neither inseparable nor interdependent’ (Szemerkényi 1996, 3). Militaries retained a great 
deal of institutional power and political influence across Europe well into the twentieth 
century, while elsewhere newly-independent revolutionary and/or authoritarian regimes in the 
Global South frequently fused political and military authority as, to an extent, did the 
communist states of the Cold War.  
Currently, major organisations actively promote the democratic control of the armed 
forces, often referred to as ‘DCAF’ or, as is increasingly common, ‘security sector reform’, as 
an explicit policy aim in the context of new and transitional states. As DCAF typically 
employs the exhortative language of transparency, accountability, morality, and, often, peace, 
rather than formal argumentation, this chapter suggests that DCAF may be understood as a 
particularly powerful, even ‘meta’, international policy myth. The chapter proceeds by 
outlining the constituent practical components and normative convictions of contemporary 
DCAF-as-policy, placing it in the context of Dvora Yanow’s understanding of the 
characteristics and functions of policy myths.  
The balance of the chapter, utilising the Foucauldian concepts of discipline and 
normalisation, argues that not only is the popular understanding of the purportedly pacific 
nature of DCAF a potent policy myth, it itself is subtly dependent upon a secondary, 
academic myth – militarism. In doing so, the chapter maps and unpacks the implication of 
policymakers and, primarily, academics in the construction and reification of these mutually-
reinforcing myths. Overall, it is argued that the discourse of militarism identifies the 
valorisation of, and participation in, violence by democratic societies as ‘deviant’ exceptions 
to the generally constraining, rational tendencies of DCAF, thus normalising the quotidian 
reliance of democracies upon the (potential for) political violence. 
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DCAF as international policy 
 
The contemporary status of DCAF as a major policy goal of a range of international 
organizations stems from the twin post-Cold War desires of Western powers to a) ensure 
European security following the break-up of the Soviet Union and b) maintaining the trans-
Atlantic NATO alliance despite the demise of the Warsaw Pact (de Santis 1994, 61-81). To 
this end, NATO created the 1994 ‘Partnership for Peace’ program, intended to support the 
democratization of aspiring NATO members through a variety of measures (NATO 2012), 
including the promotion of DCAF (Rose 1994, 13-19). Given its perceived utility in the 
promotion of democracy and regional stability – and in the absence of an ideologically-
acceptable alternative – DCAF became a preferred policy of the ‘international community’ 
(see Kaczmarska, this volume) promoted by the United Nations, the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, and the African Union, among others (see OSCE 2005; DCAF 2013; UNGA 
2008; OECD 2006). Perhaps the best expression of the growing international consensus as to 
the importance of the promotion of DCAF policies is the creation of the Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in 2000 (DCAF 2013), which works with 
virtually every major international organization in the furtherance of DCAF. It is supported 
by sixty-one member states, reflecting the extent to which DCAF has become a common 
policy (goal) of the ‘international community’. 
While a great deal of DCAF literature was developed in the 1960s and 1970s in 
relation to the ‘new’ post-colonial states in Africa and Latin America, this chapter highlights 
the extent to which, following the decline of the Soviet Union, it has become possible to 
promote the Western, liberal policy of DCAF as that of the ‘international community’ as a 
whole. In other words, while DCAF is not a recent development, its promulgation as the 
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commonsense consensus of a range of international institutions is. Correspondingly, the 
iteration of DCAF of interest here is not its context-specific meso-/micro-practice within a 
particular organization, but rather its broader construction and dissemination as an 
overarching policy goal throughout the ‘international community’.  
At this general level, DCAF is articulated as a policy regarding the formal structure of 
institutional arrangements, consisting of: a) a clear constitutional/legal division of authority 
between military and civilian authorities; b) the dependence of defense budgets and military 
deployment upon parliamentary approval; c) the cultivation of military professionalism; and 
d) building the capacity and expertise of civilian ministries of defense (Simon cited in 
Szemerkényi 1996, 67). In many instances, such structural arrangements are supplemented by 
a parallel emphasis on the role of civil society in maintaining DCAF, through a removal of 
military-related media censorship, consultation with non-governmental ‘watchdog’ 
organizations, and the formation of military labour unions (Encuţescu 2002, 87-94). 
The overall policy goal of DCAF is to address both the ‘functional imperative 
stemming from the threats to the society’s security and [the] societal imperative arising from 
the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within society’ (Volten 2002, 315-6; 
Huntington 1972, 2).  DCAF thus may be understood as reflecting the division of the modern 
(liberal) world into separate ‘spheres’ of social activity (generally understood as public and 
private, but, in this case, comprising the state, the military, and society – the ‘Clausewitzian 
trinity’) (Clausewitz 1989, 89). The goal of isolating the military from the ‘public’ life of 
politics represents a normative commitment to ‘detaching and freeing the other sectors from 
the use of force, and so eventually reducing and marginalizing the military sector itself’ 
(Buzan 1997, 23). Despite its technical emphasis on structural and institutional reform, 
DCAF is very much aimed at ‘containing’ the military/violence in order to promote peace 
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and ‘protect’ democracy – a project embedded in the broader Western cultural and 
ideological heritage of liberalism. 
 
DCAF as policy myth 
 
DCAF may be understood as a particularly potent policy myth, or ‘narrative created and 
believed by a group of people that diverts attention away from a puzzling part of their reality’ 
(Yanow 1992, 401). Drawing on Dvora Yanow’s understanding of the four elements of myth 
as narration, social construction and context, belief, and incommensurability (401), this 
section examines the cultural foundation and social function of DCAF beyond its superficial, 
technical manifestation as international policy. The most salient characteristic of DCAF as a 
policy myth is its social construction within the context of a particular time and place (401) –
the West in the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War era. The perceived ‘victory’ of 
liberal democracy following the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in an era of ‘liberal 
triumphalism’, wherein politicians, policymakers, and, to an extent, academics, attributed to 
‘liberal democracies’ an inherent peacefulness in their mutual interactions, a greater ‘moral 
reliability’ in their international relations, and an unmatched record in the protection of 
citizens rights (Reus-Smit 2005, 75). DCAF is both firmly embedded within (and a purposive 
extension of) broader Western cultural and ideological liberalism. Its explicit commitment to 
universal civil and political rights, the rule of law, democracy, rationality, and, ostensibly, 
non-violent conflict resolution (Howard 1989, 11 and 137) thus provides DCAF with a 
universalized normative foundation while obscuring the value-conflict inherent to its 
assumptions. 
Liberalism ‘regards war as an unnecessary aberration from normal international 
intercourse and believes that in a rational, orderly world wars would not exist: that they can 
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be abolished’ (Howard 1989, 137). It is this belief, and the impulse to act upon it – the 
‘liberal conscience’ (11) – that informs the narrative aspect of DCAF as meta-policy. The 
liberal understanding of history as progressive, moving towards the constant improvement of 
the human condition through the universalization of liberal values, situates DCAF firmly 
within a long, imagined, and teleological historical trajectory moving away from the rule of 
kings towards the ultimate quelling of violence through the will of the people. More 
concretely, DCAF may be understood as a specific manifestation of liberal democratic peace 
theory, which holds that due to popular sovereignty and human rationality, liberal 
democracies are the most pacific collectivity (Doyle 1983). The promotion of DCAF, 
therefore, furthers the on-going liberal project of world peace through the transformation of 
otherwise threatening societies into conformity with the liberal norm. While democratic 
peace theory does engage in logical argumentation, which is not in and of itself ‘myth-like’, 
both it and DCAF (re)produce the liberal meta-narrative of progress As this secular faith 
‘transcends a specific historical time’ (Skonieczny 2001, 439) and, in its broadest form, is 
largely ‘immune to factual attack’ (Cutherbertson qtd in Yanow 1992, 401), DCAF is imbued 
with the implicit narrative qualities of a potent policy myth. 
That the utility of DCAF as a means of protecting rights and reducing violence meets 
Yanow’s third criterion of myth – belief – hardly bears stating. While Fukuyama’s ‘end of 
history’ may not have come to pass, it is difficult to imagine a policymaker intelligibly 
arguing for any other approach to the management of the armed forces. This explicit 
promotion of DCAF by the ‘international community’, however, highlights a contradiction 
between the domestic understanding of DCAF – as containing the violent capacities of the 
military in order to safeguard external defense and internal liberty (Akkoyunlo 2007, 7) – and 
its apparent utility for the ‘international community’ as a means of preventing conflict. The 
contrast between DCAF as a policy of individual states and as a policy goal of the 
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‘international community’ highlights the final aspect of Yanow’s myth – ‘incommensurable 
values – two or more equally valued but incompatible principles embodied within a single 
policy issue’ (1992, 402). 
These values are democracy and security. Despite the denial of violence in the daily 
life of liberal democracy, the possibility of such a society, which depoliticizes violence, relied 
upon force for its inception, and continues to depend upon at least the potential for future 
violence for its maintenance (Jabri 2006, 55). As Adam Smith observed, the ‘invention of 
firearms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable, 
both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization’ (qtd. in Bowden 2009, 45). 
DCAF’s attribution of violent activities of the state to the excesses of the military is 
something of a sleight of hand, obscuring the fact that while the military might be tamed by 
politics, ‘politics’ might yet find functional value in the use of force.  
The active promotion of DCAF by the ‘international community’, however, belies the 
limits of its pacific nature, as it contains an implicit acknowledgement that non-liberal 
democratic states are potential enemies. After all, the (liberal) state monopolization of 
violence necessarily entails its exercise against those whose liberal credentials are lacking or 
suspect (van Kreieken qtd. in Bowden 2009, 147). The proselytizing impulse inherent to the 
liberal historical narrative driving the West to help Others become ‘like us’ is driven as much 
by a self-interested desire for survival, and perception of difference as threat, as it is an 
altruistic attempt to raise all peoples to a universal standard of civilization. Accession to 
DCAF thus becomes the logical means of insulating a particular state from the force of the 
liberal West. While liberalism may be couched in the language of universalism and progress, 
it has a profoundly exclusivist logic, differentiating amongst the enlightened and political, 
and the retrograde, violent Others, so as to rationalize (and facilitate) the use of force against 
them. 
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Despite what might be understood as the ‘defense’ exception, therefore, the myth of 
DCAF-as-taming military/violence, on its own, is not capable of completely reconciling this 
tension between the pacific liberal self-understanding with the war-making activities of 
democracies. There many examples of democratic states – in full control of their armed 
forces – undertaking aggressive foreign policy, from the promotion of democracy-by-force by 
the US in Iraq to the eagerness with which the French and British greeted the First World 
War (see Doyle 1983). While DCAF’s normative narrative allows it to justify the co-
existence of a defensive military with a democratic society, the myth struggles to account for 
instances in which democracies demonstrate the aggressive use of military force paired with 
an apparent societal approval of (or eagerness for) war.. For this, DCAF relies upon a second 
myth, premised upon the same normative convictions and structural understanding of 
military-state-society relations: militarism. 
 
 
Myth and normalization 
 
Drawing on the Foucauldian concepts of productive power and normalization, this chapter 
argues that in order to account for the powerful regulative effects of myth, rather than relying 
upon the vague notion of ‘belief’, it may be more useful to understand myths as involved in 
the construction of ‘truth’. Foucauldian theory understands ‘truth’ to be the product of a 
particular notion of power, which is diffuse, de-centralized, and ‘productive of meanings, 
subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct’ (Doty 1996, 
229). It is ‘implicated in all knowledge systems’, to the extent that ‘we are subjected to the 
production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth’ (Foucault 1980, 93). DCAF benefits from a host of epistemological 
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commitments bound up with liberal modernity, particularly the purportedly-objective 
character of social science, attendant fact-value distinction, and instrumental nature of policy. 
This constitution of truth makes it possible to present DCAF as a neutral policy that, while 
normatively-informed, is not a normative value itself, but the means to an end. 
Yanow’s statement that myth is ‘presented as a matter of fact’ (1992, 415) may be 
read as the expression of a complex process wherein DCAF, rather than being understood as 
a powerful, political manifestation of the broader discourse of liberal modernity, is, instead, 
considered objectively true in its instrumental utility and effectiveness. The construction of 
DCAF as a social fact thus obscures its historic contingency, facilitating its universalistic 
claims to constituting not only the best, but the sole successful policy of ‘controlling’ the 
military. Myths, therefore, are not simply ‘believed’, but believed in a particular way that 
elides their own implication in relations of power, and instead constitutes them not only as 
‘true’, but as natural. Crucially, however, most myths cannot, in their discrete form, 
completely support this process. While myths are generally effective in mediating the 
‘incommensurate values’ inherent to policy, discrepancies, such as the aforementioned 
eagerness of much of British society for war in 1914, do occur. Such incidents thus have the 
potential to imperil the authority of policy myths. Maintenance of a myth’s ‘truth’, therefore, 
relies on the ability to convincingly account for – or normalize – the many situations in which 
it is not. 
DCAF’s ‘success’ is subtly dependent upon what may be understood as a secondary, 
myth – militarism. The argument follows, analogically, from Foucault’s understanding of 
depoliticization and normalization in the penal system (Edkins 1999, 51). According to 
Foucault, prisons produce a subject (the criminal), a system of knowledge (criminology), and 
an institutional means of addressing the ‘problem’ (prisons) (12). Through the process of 
criminalization, and the correspondent normalization of ‘crime’ as an expected aspect of 
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sociality, the ‘political force of certain acts’ related to such practices is neutralized. As such, 
‘the failure of prisons in their (apparent) aim of rehabilitation is in actuality a success’, in so 
far as they reaffirm the inevitability and ‘naturalness’ of crime (12). In this reading, the 
concept of militarism supports DCAF (as practically effective and normatively valid) by 
constructing the occasional outbursts of aggression as normal, rather than a sign of systemic 
flaw.  
 
Militarism as Myth 
 
Conventional historical accounts of militarism attribute its origins to Prussia, which is often 
considered militaristic virtually from its inception, characterized by highly nationalistic 
public education, universal conscription, and the isolation of the military elites from broader 
society (Posen 1993, 80-124). Following the success of the Prussian military in the Franco-
Prussian War, so the narrative goes, other European states strove to emulate the Prussian 
system, bringing the social elevation of the military (McNeill 1984, 253-5), mass experience 
of military service, and bureaucratization of military organization to bear across the 
continent. Though, due to differing empirical manifestations of the same general process 
across Europe, there is a tendency to portray militarism as synonymous with ‘Prussianism’, 
rather than a broader social phenomenon (Summers 1976, 105), considerable consensus 
exists as to its role in promoting aggressive foreign policy (Howard 2002; Miller 1997; Bond 
1998; Vagts 1959).  
There are two significant elements to this account of the origins of militarism. In 
terms of narrative, it functions less as a ‘policy’ myth than a myth in the classical sense, 
containing ‘heroes or villains, and discernible plot lines’ (Yanow 1992, 401). Militarism, or 
the pan-societal saturation of military values or glorification of war, is attributed to early 
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Prussia which, given the presentist knowledge of the outbreak of WWI, is cast as a villain. 
The ‘spread’ of ‘Prussianism’ across Europe approximates a typical ‘fall from grace’ myth, as 
societies are presented as implicitly ‘corrupted’ by the institutional and normative pathologies 
that accompany militarism. As with policy myths, this construction of militarism, though it 
has an understanding of causality, does not engage so much in the language of logic or 
argumentation than the assertive language of description, a structure not unlike narrative. 
This highlights the, second ‘mythic’ function of the academic militarism literature – 
its implication in the construction of militarism as a ‘real’ phenemonon. The majority of work 
on the origins of militarism is, unsurprisingly, performed by historians (e.g. Vagts, Howard, 
Berghahn). According to academic convention – an important regime of power/knowledge 
production – historians are considered to work inductively from empirical evidence to reach 
factually accurate classifications, thus benefitting from cultural epistemological assumptions 
as to what ‘counts’ as knowledge and how it should be acquired, the conclusions drawn by 
historians (and social scientists) are commonly regarded as ‘truth’ (Milliken 1999, 236-7). In 
purporting to ‘describe’ or ‘study’ militarism, therefore, the academic community also 
participates in creating it.  
In doing so, the academic literature not only constructs militarism as an historic 
‘truth’, but also as a form of social pathology. For instance, much of the literature is devoted 
to identifing the specific origins and nature of militarism. One group of scholars, such as 
McNeill and Posen, for instance, considers militarism to derive from an array of institutional 
arrangements which enabled military ‘cliques’ to make policy decisions independent of 
political authorities and the ‘nation in arms’ policies of military organization and mass 
recruitment (Bond 1998, 58 and 65). Another school, in contrast, considers militarism to be a 
social and political phenomenon, characterized by a ‘vast array of customs, interests, prestige, 
actors, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military 
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purposes’ (Vagts 1959, 13), highlighting ‘ideational’ factors – such as the ability of 
democracy to create personal identification between ‘the people’ and the state (Howard 2009, 
110-2) – as significant to militarism’s development.  
The impression left by both schools is one of diagnosis. Due to the association of 
militarism with the outbreak of WWI, scholarly interest in its historical origins and various 
manifestations stems from a desire to understand ‘what went wrong’ – thus reifying an 
absence of conflict as normal. As such, despite its mythic narrative, the specifics of 
militarism are understood in a highly evaluative way, through the lens of ostensibly objective 
social scientific language of characteristics, causes, and effects. Correspondingly, perhaps the 
greatest legacy of the historic militarism literature is the indelibly negative normative 
character of, if not the concept itself, certainly any situation to which it is applied.1  
Similar to the way in which the prison system – and its attendant academic discipline 
of criminology – are understood to (re)produce the social category of ‘delinquency’ as a 
social pathology through a process of scientific labeling, study, and evaluation (Foucault 
1995, 276-7; Edkins 1999, 50), so too does the academic treatment of militarism present it as 
a problem to be solved. In doing so, the academic construction of militarism suggests that it is 
‘possible to supervise it’, and to channel the social pathology into ‘forms of illegality [or 
violence] that are less dangerous: maintained by pressures of control on the fringes of 
society’ (Foucault 1995, 278). Identifying militarism as a transgressive social practice thus 
renders it amenable to intervention, and provides the impetus for isolation, mitigation, and/or 
control. The academic ‘creation’ of militarism thus renders a complex social phenomenon 
‘knowable’ and, like crime, theoretically amenable to eradication. 
 
                                                     
1 For a notable exception to this point, see Shaw 1991, 12. 
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DCAF and militarism 
 
The policy intervention(s) intended to forestall militarism both reflect and inform the 
prescriptive logics and normative assumptions of DCAF. The mainstream academic 
militarism literature may be divided into two broad schools of thought roughly reflecting the 
institutional vs. sociological/cultural diagnoses of pathology evident in the previous historical 
analysis, which, despite their differing emphases, demonstrate striking similarity in their 
‘treatment’ of militarism.  
As a means of framing the discussion, it should be clarified that it is not the intention 
of this chapter to suggest that militarism scholarship either purposively works in concert with 
DCAF or has been directly drafted into service as a means of explicit justification/validation 
of liberalism’s occasional violent lapses. Militarism, while important, is not the sole source of 
DCAF’s policy authority, nor was it created as an active excuse for its failures. The point 
made here is rather more subtle, and rests on demonstrating the degree to which militarism 
scholarship – much of which was consciously written against the violent tendencies and 
cultural valorization of the military in liberal democracies – is, in essence, drawing from the 
same ideological well and foundational assumptions as DCAF, thus limiting the bounds of 
effective critique. What is at stake is not the way in which particular academics or specific 
definitions of militarism construct the relationship between violence and politics in liberal 
democracies, as all presented here are necessarily archetypes, but rather the way in which the 
creation of militarism as real (and pathological) inadvertently serves to normalize the 
violence of liberal democracies, preserving the normative validity and technical efficacy of 
DCAF. 
 
Institutions and civil-military relations  
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The first such approach to the phenomenon of militarism, the civil-military relations (CMR) 
school, is typified by a strict focus on the military institution. It emphasizes ‘institutional and 
formal’ factors in examining the structural relationship between distinct civil, political, and 
military spheres (Barak and Sheffer 2010, 15). It is primarily framed by a central concern: the 
separation of the military from other spheres of social life through the delineation of an 
appropriate relationship between the military and the civilian government. Virtually every 
scholars supports the ‘common-sense’ assertion, explicit to the DCAF policy literature, that 
the military ought to be subject to the civilian government, and apolitical in nature. Political 
neutrality is understood as the abstention from formal partisan politics or seeking civilian 
governmental authority. When this arrangement fails, and the military becomes involved in 
national politics, it is as a result of the ‘political institutional structure of society’, rather than 
a characteristic of the military itself (Huntington 2006, 192-4). Other scholars argue that that 
a professional military ought to be educated so as to actively generate a deep commitment not 
to neutrality per se, but ‘the rules of the [democratic] political process’ (Janowitz 1977, 22 
and 78). CMR scholars agree, however, that a professional military is crucial to avoiding 
institutionally-generated militarism, or a military regime (78).  
With respect to DCAF, this portrayal of militarism illustrates two important findings. 
The first is that, in its unambiguous diagnosis of militarism as the result of a 
structural/institutional pathology that enables the military to participate in politics, this 
literature, akin to the prescriptive, outcome-oriented nature of DCAF, and its persistent 
promotion by the West as a means of coping with developing and transitional states, is clearly 
‘problem-solving’ in nature. Not only does this reify militarism as a social pathology, but, 
due to the historical entanglement of such scholarship with the development of policy 
towards the Cold War ‘Third World’, it mirrors the normative tenets and policy assumptions 
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of DCAF; the bodies of work were co-produced. The presentation of the military by CMR 
scholars as ‘less a source of influence on society at large, than a sphere which has been 
profoundly circumscribed by the wider society’ (Shaw 1991, 74-5) (re)produces DCAF’s 
cultural embeddedness in the modern liberal understanding of human sociality as divided into 
discrete realms of activity (74-5). By presentating DCAF as the only logical solution to a 
dangerous social pathology, the literature elevates the strict separation between civilian 
authorities, the military, and society to a normative imperative. As such, the social scientific 
designation of DCAF as a bulwark against militarism furthers the policy’s authority, and 
bolsters its status as ‘common-sense’, naturalized truth.  
Perhaps more significant, however, is the second, subtler way in which structural 
approaches to militarism legitimate DCAF. CMR scholars take great pains to differentiate 
between what are considered to be normal, acceptable, activities of the military, such as 
defensively preparing for war, and the development of militarism. In endorsing the 
foundational assumptions of the normative validity and functional efficacy of an idealized 
model of DCAF, the militarism literature implicitly naturalizes the ‘regular’ use of force by 
the military. As argued by Foucault with respect to crime, the penal system is concerned, 
despite its rhetoric, less with the eradication of crime than with ‘handling 
illegalities…differentiat[ing] them…and provid[ing] them with a general “economy”’ 
(Foucault 1995, 272). The labeling and policy ‘treatment’ of deviant social behavior is not 
about abolishing objectively ‘bad’ acts, but about creating an implicit ordering in which some 
acts are considered pathological while others are not. The militarism literature constructs an 
ordering of violence wherein militarism is carved out from the broader ambit of military-
related force as a ‘deviant’ case, thus rendering the state-authorized use of force normatively 
unremarkable. Through this process of naturalization, this particular conception of militarism 
helps resolve a tension within DCAF between the obvious use of force by liberal democracies 
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and its apparent ‘success’ in promoting peace, as the habitual use of force by democracies, 
when conducted in accordance with legal oversight processes (and, therefore, is not 
militaristic), literally does not count.  
 
Critical Militarism Scholarship  
 
The critical school of militarism scholarship, while still concerned with the military as a 
socially-embedded institution, emphasizes primarily sociological, but also cultural, material, 
and ideological/ideational factors in its analysis of the military as ‘a major arena for social 
exchanges’ (Barak and Sheffer 2010, 19 (fn3)). Associated scholars focus on broad patterns 
of social interaction, examining the military as a banal, pervasive, and everyday influence 
upon liberal society. Correspondingly, critical militarism scholars aim to problematize the 
taken-for-granted state of liberal affairs.2 
For the purposes of this discussion, this diverse work is parsed by the degree to which 
the criticism challenges the normativity of liberalism. At one end of the spectrum is a 
literature which employs ‘militarism’ explicitly diagnostically, to suggest something is ‘off’ 
in the typical/desirable ordering of liberal society. In contrast to the institutional anxiety 
exhibited by CMR scholars, the normative concern of these narrowly critical scholars lies in 
their perception of an excessive military influence upon society. The many studies, polemics, 
and popular commentaries in this category indicate an underlying anxiety that military 
values, symbols, or attitudes are ‘leaking’ from their institutional container into a broader 
                                                     
2 It must be noted that this criticality operates at differing degrees and, crucially, that not all critical studies of 
the military are necessarily studies of militarism. Many works that fall under the ambit of broader critical 
war/military studies,  which conceptualize politics and violence as continuous, constitutive aspects of sociality, 
largely avoid the issues raised here. For this approach, see Barkawi 2011.  
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society which, without militarism, would be fully democratic and liberal (see Dixon 2012 and 
Bacevich 2005).  
Though, like the CMR scholars, this work demonstrates a DCAF-inflected desire to 
detach the military from politics, it is distinguished by its understanding of politics as either 
a) all activities taking place within the public sphere or b) pervasive to broader social life, 
rather than simply formal democratic processes. The military is not just to be institutionally 
constrained, but also isolated from society. This is in keeping with the recent iterations of 
DCAF, which hold that ‘demilitarization must transcend the idea of the formal withdrawal of 
the military from the political arena’ and emphasizes a form of ‘deeper’ democracy, wherein 
civil society and the media also over-see and moderate the military (Houngnikpo 2010, 26; 
Encuţescu 2002, 87-94). Due to their common implication in liberal modernity, therefore, 
both schools (re)produce, almost as a normative imperative, the distinction between the 
‘spheres’ of society inherent to DCAF. Given this understanding of the appropriate structure 
of society, DCAF is once again reified as the only logical ‘treatment’ for combatting incipient 
militarism. 
The majority of critical militarism scholarship, however, works to problematize this 
‘spherical’ conceptualization, suggesting that militarism is not antithetical to the workings of 
liberalism (Stavrianakis and Selby 2012, 6). Examples of this perspective include analyses 
which, generally, consider militarism to be diffuse throughout various cultural productions, 
such as film and video-games, which promote military values, masculinities, and rationales as 
both normatively exemplar and geopolitically exigent (Stahl 2010, 48; see also Ó Tuathail 
2005; Dalby 2008). From a more sociological perspective, the many studies investigating 
specific institutional-cultural-ideational configurations of militarism – militarism with 
adjectives – ranging from  British ‘nostalgia militarism’ (Shaw 1991, 118), to ‘militarized 
socialism’, (Mann 1987, 46) to even civilian-targeting ‘terror-militarism’ (Shaw 2005, 132) 
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fall within this rubric. This school also encompasses the many feminist investigations of the 
relationship between militarism and patriarchy – a process of militarization deeply implicated 
in subject-formation (Enloe 2004, 2007; Stavrianakis and Selby 2012, 14).  
Despite this school’s explicitly critical engagement with liberalism, however – as well 
as its exposition of the arbitrariness of state violence – from the meta-perspective of myth-
making and truth production, it subtly reproduces the distinction between liberalism and 
militarism, and violence and politics. Stavrianakis and Selby, for instance, construct 
militarism as ‘either a concept or object of analysis’ (2012, 5), further affirming militarism as 
‘real’. Similarly, though the distinction is fine, it is worth noting that while recognizing that 
militarism and liberalism may co-exist, or that liberalism is prone to militarism (Edgerton 
1991; Wood 2007), is an important critical move, it is not the same as suggesting that the 
violent phenomenon associated with militarism are, in fact, necessary to liberalism. This is 
illustrated by the literature’s frequent call for the ‘demilitarization’ of certain aspects of social 
life, exemplified by Enloe’s intriguing suggestion that it ought, hypothetically, be possible to 
conceive of a ‘less militarized’ military (2007, 78-80). The notion that militarism may ‘wax 
and wane’, or be ameliorated through ‘demilitarization’, suggests that as its severity/intensity 
is subject to change, it ought, at least theoretically, be possible to excise militarism from 
liberalism. Though the point is somewhat semantic, it is non-trivial: liberalism might support, 
manifest, or even actively encourage militarism, but it is not necessarily militaristic, not 
necessarily violent.3 
                                                     
3 Such a move also tends to naturalize the militarized yet (superficially and formally) non-military quotidian 
coercive practices of liberal democracies – such as the use of riot police, the detention of illegal migrants, or 
torture – through the construction of militarism as a powerful, emotionally resonant social pathology explicitly 
defined in terms of its association with the institutional military. Critical scholarship may inadvertently 
naturalize non-military violence either through elision, or, somewhat paradoxically, through its characterization 
as military, and thus subsumed within the original pathology. 
 19 
Overall, in contrast to CMR scholars who maintain the social prestige of the military, 
the critical/sociological school, in its general concern regarding the undue influence of the 
military over society, implicitly constructs association with the military as a normative ill. As 
a result, though not exhibited in each piece by each associated scholar, in the aggregate, the 
school tends to conceptually collapse violence more generally with the military, implying that 
the ‘containment’ of violence to the military will succeed in protecting democracy and pacific 
civil life. This has the effect of suggesting that in the absence of contamination by ‘military 
values’, liberal society would be, for the narrowly critical scholars generally pacific, or, for 
the others, at least significantly improved. Militaristic outbursts may be understood as 
inherently pathological and ‘blamed’ on either the military directly, or the entanglement and 
mutual-reinforcement of aggressive and patriarchal military values and ideals with liberalism 
itself. While militarism may co-occur, is not constructed as a normal, constitutive aspect of 
liberal democracy. This thus, at a deeper level than the simple reification of the ‘spherical’ 
understanding of society, bolsters DCAF’s normative claims by preserving the ideological 
coherency of its underlying liberalism through the conceptual exclusion of instances of 
liberalism’s failure to adhere to its own principles from constituting liberalism at all. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In the aggregate, the myth of militarism supports the policy authority of DCAF as ‘true’ in a 
variety of ways. The first is to naturalize the ‘regular’ military violence of liberal states 
through the creation of an illiberal economy which, through the distinction of ‘militaristic’ 
violence as an inherent social pathology, renders other forms, in simple contrast, normal and 
unremarkable. In this way, the habitual use of force by liberal democracies undertaken in 
accordance with democratic checks and balances fails to constitute militarism, and thus, often 
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fails to garner active politico-normative concern. Correspondingly, the use of force by DCAF 
states is presented as continuous with, rather than opposed to, the policy’s general principles. 
The potential tension between the pursuit of security and liberal values is thus resolved 
through the naturalization of the use of military force as a normal aspect of democratic 
governance. 
The second function of militarism in supporting DCAF relates to the role of historians 
and social scientists in its construction as a ‘true’ academic myth. The majority of the 
highlighted scholarship conceptualizes militarism as a social phenomenon that ‘breaks out’ 
when something is ‘off’ in institutional arrangements, political ideologies, or cultural 
representations of the military within society. Militarism, like crime, is presented as an 
intermittent, cyclical, social force. Its construction as ‘deviant’ therefore, does not normalize 
militarism itself, but rather its occurrence as an inevitability to be managed. The academic 
study of militarism, akin to Foucault’s understanding of criminology, and the creation of a 
policy and institutional structure to control it (analogous to the prison) simultaneously create, 
combat, and, in doing so, reproduce the social ill they are forged to eradicate. In a similar 
fashion, then, to the way the ‘reality’ of delinquency legitimates the power to punish, 
militarism naturalizes DCAF as the means of governing the use of force while simultaneously 
obscuring ‘any element of excess or abuse it may entail’ (302).  
Correspondingly, the myth of militarism ‘effac[es] what may be violent in one and 
arbitrary in the other’, understood here as liberality and democracy, and, in doing so, 
‘attenuat[es] the effects of revolt they may arouse’ (303). Through the construction of 
militarism in such a way as to inadvertently yet significantly, implicitly elevate DCAF as the 
logical ‘solution’ to terrible social pathology, the policy comes to constitute a normative 
imperative in of itself. As a result, the ‘other’ violence of democratic societies is, to varying 
degrees, naturalized and depoliticized. Militarism, therefore, as crime to the carceral system, 
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rather than constituting what at first might be understood as a definitive policy failure, 
actually supports the myth of DCAF’s normativity and efficacy. The construction of 
militarism as pathological yet inevitable simultaneously ‘explains away’ DCAF’s failures to 
eradicate aggressive foreign policy, naturalizes the system’s ‘other’ coercive ‘excesses’, and 
justifies the policy’s continued existence. The academic myth of militarism as an ‘actual’ 
collective social transgression, due to a common intellectual and historical heritage, is a 
perfect foil to the tenets and assumptions inherent to the DCAF policy myth. 
This mutually-reinforcing construction of DCAF and militarism thus raises the 
question as to whether they actually constitute two separate myths, or whether policymakers 
and academics are reproducing the same savoir, or regulative body of knowledge, albeit in 
the distinctive idioms of their respective practice. The intertwining of the two logics raised 
here should not be taken as a condemnation of militarism scholarship – or, indeed, even 
DCAF itself, which, though problematic, contributes to the everyday security of many 
individuals, peoples, and societies – but rather a reflection of the limitations of critique (and 
failure of language) within a context of ideological, cultural, and normative hegemony. What 
this argument suggests, therefore, is that we should perhaps strive, as do many of the critical 
scholars referenced here, for a greater recognition of and attentiveness to the role of 
academics as myth-makers, even (or particularly) when the connection between scholarship 
and policy seems remote.  
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